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The prevalence of underweight children in Bihar is higher than
in any country in the world, and the provision of public services
to address malnutrition is poor. Based on an assessment of the
government’s nutritional support to mothers and children, this
column sheds light on the grim public service delivery, likely
causes, and ideas to address the problem.
Bihar’s child malnutrition rate is higher than any country in the
world (Menon et al 2009, Grebmer et al 2011). Over half of the
children under five years of age are underweight or stunted,
indicating chronic malnourishment (NFHS-3)[1]. Recognising
this, the Bihar state government and the central government
have committed over Rs. 1,100 crore ($200 million approx.)
per year for the Supplementary Nutrition Programme (SNP)
administered by the Directorate of Integrated Child
Development Services (ICDS). However, programme funds are
regularly pilfered, and on-the-ground public service delivery is
lacking.
We, together with our team at IDinsight[2], conducted a study
to quantify the extent and sources of this pilferage using
unannounced visits by independent surveyors (IDinsight 2013)
[3]. We find that 53% of SNP funds are not spent on the
ground, amounting to an annual loss of nearly Rs. 600 crore
($110 million approx.).[4] The two main components (and
sources of leakage) for SNP are hot cooked meals for three to
six year olds, and take-home rations (THR) for pregnant and
lactating mothers and children younger than three. Each
anganwadi (government run pre-school) is provided with
around Rs. 4600 ($ 80 approx.) and Rs. 5800 ($ 105 approx.)
per month for hot cooked meals and THR respectively. We find
that 71% of funds meant for hot cooked meals and 38% of
THR funds are pilfered[5].
Finally, it should be noted that this study is not about the
efficacy of SNP itself. There is no clear evidence that SNP, even
if functioning well, reduces malnutrition (Lokshin et al 2005).
In fact, owing to SNP’s low coverage[6] poor targeting of
impoverished households (Gragnolati et al 2006) and intended
beneficiaries within households[7], and lack of focus on very
young children, it may not have the desired nutritional impact.
However, while these design issues should be addressed,
improving the status of SNP is vital from a public service
delivery point of view. This requires an understanding of
potential causes of poor performance, design changes to address
these, field pilots to optimise design changes, and rigorous
impact evaluations to learn if they have the desired effect. This
22/06/2017 Bihar’s Malnutrition Crisis and Potential solutions - IGC
http://www.theigc.org/blog/bihars-malnutrition-crisis-and-potential-solutions/ 2/6
impact evaluations to learn if they have the desired effect. This
is a model for how social sector organisations can diagnose
problems, experiment with ideas, and scale up ideas that are
proven to work. Our study, in fact, serves as the foundation for
such an approach, in which two interventions to improve public
service delivery in Bihar ICDS will be piloted and rigorously
evaluated.
Sources of fund leakage
In unannounced visits to 200 anganwadis across three districts
of Bihar[8], 24% of them were closed during times they should
have been open, and meals were only served on 59% of the
days they should have been served. When anganwadis were
open and meals were served, only 22 children on average out of
40 that should attend were present. And in these meals, only
three quarters of the stipulated nutritional ingredients were
used.
Figure 1 below illustrates how each of these factors contributed
to the final tally of 71% of funds allocated for hot cooked
meals not being spent. Closed anganwadis and poor child
attendance together account for two-thirds of the missing
expenditure.
Interestingly, ingredient prices are fixed by ICDS across Bihar
and are sometimes not adjusted for 2 to 3 years, despite high
inflation. Due to this, ingredients needed to prepare the meals
cost around 20% more than the amount allocated by ICDS.
However, because of the low expenditure in the first place, this
only increases expenditure by 5 percentage points (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Missing expenditure on hot cooked meals
Approximately 38% of funds are missing from THR, which
provides bags of rice and lentils to young children and mothers.
Although, 84% of beneficiaries reported receiving some rice
and lentils during the past month, two thirds of the missing
expenditure under the THR component is due to low volumes
of rice and dal. Often, beneficiaries lament that they only got a
handful of lentils, while books showed that the anganwadi
worker provided them with 2 kilos of lentils.[9]
What factors contribute to this status quo?
Our team’s extensive field visits and stakeholder interviews
have shed light on the possible causes for the widespread
pilferage or the proverbial ‘last mile problems’ of ICDS[10].
There are few mechanisms to hold service providers
accountable. From the demand-side, beneficiaries do not seem
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accountable. From the demand-side, beneficiaries do not seem
to be aware of their entitlements. Parents have often told us that
they are “satisfied” because their children at least get
“something”. Additionally, anganwadi workers seem to have
significant discretion in choosing beneficiaries, and families may
worry they will be struck off the beneficiary list if they
complain. In many surveys, beneficiaries made efforts to ensure
that we did not record anything negative about their local
anganwadi worker.
We also found that parents may not consider their children
malnourished.[11] Therefore, SNP is likely treated as just a little
extra food rather than a fundamental necessity (since the
problem of hunger is not as acute as that of malnourishment in
the state[12] ), further reducing its demand.
On the supply side, monitoring by ICDS officials is highly
infrequent. According to our study, only 21% of anganwadi
workers (rather than the expected 60% if the official ICDS
guidelines are followed)[13] had received visits from their Child
Development Project Officer (CDPO) in the past three months.
[14] In addition, the anganwadis where supervisors visited were
no more likely to provide a meal, suggesting the ineffectiveness
of the current monitoring system.[15] Moreover, performance
tracking of the entire ICDS hierarchy (and not just the
anganwadi workers) is inadequate.
Systemic issues within ICDS in Bihar may encourage front line
workers to fudge accounts or steal, which is a slippery slope for
larger amounts being pilfered. For example, anganwadi workers
almost never get paid on time. They receive honorariums for six
to nine months in one go, and typically with a significant and
unpredictable lag. Some workers have admitted to us that, given
this situation, it is only natural to siphon off SNP funds, which
arrive monthly. Similarly, some anganwadi workers are reputed
to have paid huge sums of money[16] to attain their positions.
In such cases, siphoning off SNP funds is viewed as a “right” of
the anganwadi worker, as they feel justified in getting monthly
pay-offs given their large upfront “investment”.
As mentioned earlier, food prices are fixed by ICDS and are
lower than market prices.[17] Our study found that market
prices were on average more than 20% higher than ICDS
stipulated rates.[18] Therefore, even the most honest anganwadi
workers buy less than the stipulated quantity. This then makes
it very difficult to hold errant workers accountable, as market
prices provide a ready justification to explain non-provision of
meals (“money ran out”), or lesser quantities of key ingredients
(“lentils are too expensive”).
Ideas to improve Bihar’s nutrition programme
Leadership at Bihar’s Department for Social Welfare and ICDS
has proposed two interventions to improve SNP and requested
rigorous evaluations of the same.
The first intervention uses technology to facilitate demand- and
supply-side accountability. On the demand side, a call centre
will randomly call beneficiaries to solicit information on the
functioning of their local anganwadi, and to pass on
information such as guidelines on their entitlements, updates on
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information such as guidelines on their entitlements, updates on
financial transfers to their anganwadi worker, an assessment of
their local anganwadi etc. This could solve the above mentioned
problems of beneficiaries not knowing their rights, and the risk
of losing benefits when demanding better service[19]. However,
it remains to be seen whether information alone is sufficient to
empower the beneficiaries to demand better service, given on-
the-ground caste and power dynamics between anganwadi
workers and beneficiaries.
On the supply side, supervisory officials will receive
smartphones with an anganwadi-monitoring application, GPS
and camera to increase the frequency, quality, transparency and
verifiability of their monitoring reports. Data from these
monitoring visits and from beneficiary reports will be
aggregated to suit different stakeholders, and made available
publicly. To be effective, the information generated through this
intervention should be consistently used to manage and
incentivise[20] all levels of the ICDS staff.
The second intervention is to administer SNP via JEEViKA[21]
self-help groups. This has the potential to increase demand side
accountability, as 50% of ICDS beneficiaries in JEEViKA-
operated blocks are members of these self-help-groups. This
would address the previously mentioned problem of
beneficiaries being afraid to demand better services on their
own. Here too a rigorous evaluation will be critical to
determine the efficacy of this intervention, especially given this
will be a new role for JEEViKA.
Concluding thoughts
There are no sure solutions to reduce leakage and improve the
provision of food to Bihar’s millions of malnourished children
and mothers. We plan to iteratively pilot the suggested
interventions on the ground to optimise their design, and
undertake rigorous evaluations to measure their effects on
nutritional service delivery and beneficiary outcomes.
The eagerness of the Government of Bihar and ICDS to
innovate and adjust programme design, and to use rigorous
evaluations to inform their decisions, provides hope for millions
throughout Bihar. This model of innovating, learning from
evidence, and using these to improve on-the-ground public
service delivery is a model for government departments all over
India.
This column is a direct result of extensive deliberations within
IDinsights India team, which includes Neil Buddy Shah, a
Founding Partner at IDinsight, and Associates Apurva Bamezai,
Anand Kothari, and Stuart Shirrell.
Notes:
1. As per the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3) for Bihar
conducted in 2005-2006, 56% of children under-five are
underweight, and 56% are stunted.
2. IDinsight uses rigorous evaluations as a decision-making tool for
policy makers and managers. Read more here:
www.IDinsight.org.
3. For the full study, click here. This study serves as the foundation
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3. For the full study, click here. This study serves as the foundation
on which to iteratively pilot and then rigorously evaluate two
interventions aimed at reducing pilferage in this important
government programme.
4. If the performance in the rest of the state and throughout the
year is similar to the surveyed areas and survey period.
5. While our measurements are at the anganwadi level, we are not
suggesting that anganwadi workers pilfer all the funds.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that pilfered funds are distributed
among other village-level officials and are sent up the hierarchy
as well. Due to the non-transparent and illegal nature of such
pilferage, we were not able to capture this formally in our study.
6. Attempts to ask sensitive corruption-related questions to
anganwadi workers and beneficiaries based on established survey
methods for such questions (randomised response technique,
corruption perception surveys etc.) were not effective in this
context.
7. Using ICDS’ “Know Your Anganwadi” dataset, we calculated
that ICDS is only reaching 31% of the eligible beneficiaries of the
state.
8. We find that 98% of beneficiaries share THR with others in the
family. This is critical because undernourishment during a child’s
first 1000 days affects lifelong indicators of malnourishment and
health, and even education and income levels (Ruel, 2010).
9. Districts were chosen to ensure representation from Bihar’s
major linguistic regions, covering geographical variations. In
addition, the average across the three districts on key parameters
such as literacy and gender ratio were very similar to the Bihar
average. More details on our methodology can be found in the
full report.
10. The exact entitlement of rice and lentils per beneficiary depends
on their registered nutritional category.
11. Please note these are hypotheses and have not been tested
formally. Our future work will rigorously evaluate interventions
designed to address some of these causes. You can read about it
here: http://www.3ieimpact.org/en/evidence/impact-
evaluations/details/723/
12. This is corroborated in the HUNGaMA report 2011
(HUNGaMA 2011), which shows that only 7.6% of mothers in
the 112 “focus districts” across 9 states surveyed had even heard
the word ‘malnutrition’ in their local language.
13. Prevalence of calorie-undernourishment in Bihar is 17.3%
(Menon et al 2009), which is far lower than malnourishment
indicators of underweight children (56%).
14. Based on authors’ calculations
15. Similarly, low visit rates were found for Lady Supervisors, vis-à-
vis their expected visit-rate.
16. Of course, we are only reporting a correlation (association) here
between performance and supervision. We recognise the real
possibility of reverse causality, wherein more monitoring visits
may be done in poorly functioning anganwadis.
17. We have heard that sums ranging from Rs. 40,000 to Rs.
200,000 ($700 to $3,600 approx.) are paid to attain positions.
However, this has not been verified. Also, please note that many
of these sums are from 5 to 10 years ago (or longer), and hence,
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of these sums are from 5 to 10 years ago (or longer), and hence,
their current value adjusted for inflation will be much higher.
18. ICDS is currently updating prices, which were last fixed as far
back as 2008, based on information from IDinsight’s survey and
other sources. ICDS is also considering entering a more flexible
pricing system to reflect market realities better.
19. We visited 172 shopkeepers to collect price intelligence, and also
asked anganwadi workers and beneficiaries about prices of
foodstuffs.
20. On the assumptions that beneficiaries can be convinced that their
feedback is anonymous, which it is.To read more on motivating
India’s community workers, read Nava Ashraf’s column on Ideas
for India, and a synthesis of J-PAL research on incentives for
attendance here.
21. World Bank funded government body facilitating women’s self-
help-groups in Bihar. Read more here: www.brlp.in
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